Jan 15, 2021. Greece
Analysis: With
rapid changes in the Middle East amid a fluid geopolitical landscape, Turkey
could be poised to mend ties with Israel.
The start of the past decade had been anything but promising for Israeli-Turkish ties.
Following the deadly Mavi Marmara incident in
May 2010, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have continued to deteriorate, reaching
their nadir in 2018 when Ankara expelled the Israeli ambassador.
But with rapid changes in the Middle East amid
a fluid geopolitical landscape, Turkey may adapt its position to seek a more
flexible policy and new partnerships in the region, including with Israel.
How
Israeli-Turkish ties reached an impasse
On 31 May 2010,
Israeli commandos stormed the Mavi Marmara approximately 70 nautical miles from
the Israeli coast. The Turkish-owned boat was the lead ship in a
six-vessel flotilla heading to Gaza to provide humanitarian aid to the Palestinian
people.
Nine Turkish
nationals were killed as a result of the raid, marking a key turning point in
the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish relations. However, despite fierce
political reactions and harsh rhetoric, diplomatic and commercial ties between
the two countries largely continued.
That all changed
eight years later, shortly after the Trump administration's decision to move
the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The exceptional significance of
Jerusalem for the Palestinian cause fueled mass demonstrations across the
occupied Palestinian territories, triggering a brutal Israeli response.
In Gaza, Israeli forces shot and killed more
than 60 Palestinians in one day during protests, leading to
international condemnation. Turkey decisively confronted the situation, with
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan calling Israel an "apartheid state"
and personally criticising Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
At the same time,
the Turkish government expelled the Israeli ambassador from Ankara, prompting
Israel to do the same with the Turkish Consul in Jerusalem. These moves brought
bilateral relations to a renewed, rougher diplomatic standstill, but with one
critical difference; this time the impasse had a grave impact on Turkish-Israeli
commercial ties.
Tel Aviv has instead been gradually turning to Ankara's foes, such
as Greece and Cyprus, signing a €6 billion
EastMed pipeline project deal with both countries in early
2020. The establishment
of the EastMed Gas Forum (EMGF) in September last year, and Turkey's exclusion
from the club, clearly indicated that Ankara's vested economic interests were
at stake.
Regional
ambitions
These developments
come at a time when Erdogan's Turkish foreign policy strategy has significantly
expanded. Contrary to the first years of the AKP's rule, when
the president's priority was to restructure the Turkish economy and consolidate
his domestic stronghold, in the 2010s and particularly after 2015, Erdogan has
been battling to decisively expand Turkey's international footprint.
The re-emergence of Turkey as a key regional player is
clearly being felt across the Middle East, from Ankara's involvement in the
Syrian war to its intervention in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh.
A key characteristic of Turkey's bid for influence has
been for Erdogan to present himself as a defender of the Muslim world,
with observers describing Ankara's foreign policy strategy as driven by both
pan-Islamic and "neo-Ottoman" sentiments.
This is exactly
where the Turkish-Israeli showdown fits in. Ties with Tel Aviv have
traditionally been a hot potato for most Arab leaders, a political challenge
permanently fueled by the suppression of Palestinians under Israel's military
occupation. The developments of the past year, however, have challenged this
narrative.
The formal establishment of ties between
Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have
created a new regional context. Considering
that both Abu Dhabi and Manama are heavily influenced by Saudi Arabia, the
agreements almost certainly proceeded with Riyadh's blessing.
Hosting the two
holiest Islamic sites, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia has traditionally been
the most influential Sunni power worldwide. The fact that Riyadh indirectly
'legitimised' the normalisation agreements appeared to present an opportunity
for Erdogan to fill a developing vacuum as the principal guardian of the Muslim
world.
Turkey may adapt its position to seek a more flexible
policy and new partnerships in the region,
including with Israel
Ankara adapts to an ever-changing context
One essential
characteristic of international politics and foreign relations is that they are
fluid and ever-changing. The recent rapprochement between Qatar and the GCC,
which largely took place on Doha's terms, has been concerning for Ankara.
Moreover, the
limited backlash across the Arab world following the UAE and Bahrain's
normalisation agreements with Tel Aviv indicates that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is not dictating the international political agenda to the same extent
as previous decades.
Being a pragmatic
and realist leader, Erdogan has swiftly adjusted the official Turkish position
towards Israel. From an aggressive stance with frequent public criticism against
Tel Aviv, Ankara has now adopted a conciliatory attitude seeking to
re-establish damaged ties.
The Turkish president now understands that, given the current trajectory in the
Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, a zero-sum strategy could prove to be
too risky for Turkey. In this sense, one could expect to see further
unanticipated changes in Turkish foreign policy in response to ever-changing
future geopolitical conditions.
Alex Kassidiaris
is an International Security Advisor based in London. He holds a master's
degree from the War Studies Department of King's College London and his
research interests include security and politics in the Eastern Mediterranean
and Middle East.
Alex Kassidiaris is an International Security Advisor
based in London. He holds a master's degree from the War Studies
Department of King's College London and his research interests include security
and politics in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.