Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya, left, poses with Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, right, prior to their talks in Ankara, Turkey, July 27, 2020. (Fatih Aktas/Turkish Foreign Ministry via AP, Pool)
Amid a period in which geopolitical tensions are heating up in
the Eastern Mediterranean, Spain is stepping up its diplomatic efforts to lower
the temperatures.
by Xavier Palacios*
As tensions between Greece and Turkey were heating up last
summer, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Arancha González Laya visited both
countries’ capitals on July 27 and 28 and called for a détente between the
Greeks and Turks.
Gónzalez Laya appealed to shared political interests, spheres, and
institutions, such as NATO, in an effort to de-escalate tensions that
resulted from the presence of Turkish exploratory vessels in the Eastern
Mediterranean region, which violated Greek and Cypriot internationally
recognized waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).
Much of Spain’s leverage in this diplomatic endeavor has
relied partly on Spain’s geographical position as a Mediterranean coastal
state, its historically low-key role, and its shared private and strategic
interests in the region (mainly in hydrocarbons extraction and banking
sectors), alongside Madrid’s growing partnership with Ankara.
Spain has used common aims and institutions to further
leverage Turkey’s policies in the East Mediterranean. It has mainly relied on
Turkey’s NATO membership for bridge-building, while framing this approach under
the EU’s political and economic policies and interests.
Behind the Scenes: Spain’s Mediator Role
Last summer Turkey and Greece appeared close to an open armed conflict over
control of the Aegean Sea’s coastal waters. Turkey’s underwater exploratory
vessels for natural resources threatened Greece and Cyprus’ national waters’ sovereignty,
triggering a collision between Greek and Turkish
military vessels this past August.
These clashes followed political and economic developments
that had already intensified Athens and Ankara’s friction, such as the maritime
boundary agreement between Turkey and the Libyan Government of National Accord,
the East Med Pipeline agreement between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and the
conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, among other challenging events.
Top EU leaders called on Ankara to stop its unilateral
exploration activities, with Brussels giving its explicit support to Athens and
Nicosia. With Washington’s support, Germany took the lead in late June to calm the waters in the
Aegean Sea and encourage further dialogue between Greece and Turkey. At the
same time, Germany’s position counterbalanced open hostilities
between France and Turkey.
As the EU tried not to take further antagonistic measures
against Turkey, Spain entered the scene within EU and NATO institutional
frameworks. While in Ankara, Spain’s Foreign Minister stated, “Turkey is a NATO
ally, not only a friend. In NATO you don’t have only friends, you have allies.”
These words became one of the few public
statements of support for Turkey, which came from Western political spheres, as
the Spanish minister extended a helping hand to Ankara to address the conflict
with Athens and establish a Greek-Turkish dialogue.
The leverage exerted by Spain on the Turkish government
appears to have contributed to a de-escalation of tensions in the Eastern
Mediterranean and a greater push for Turkey’s EU membership. According to
a report published by the Spanish think
tank Real Instituto Elcano: “All [past] Prime Ministers of Spain […] have
supported Turkey’s integration in the Union.”
“Both Socialists and Conservatives in Spain share common
ground in supporting Turkey’s EU membership. Since it has never been a major
issue in public debate, it has never been a salient item during national
elections,” the report adds. “Also, there is no Turkish community or minority
lobby to please or historical bilateral issues to resolve. This gives Spain a
privileged position amongst the big member states of the EU.”
Similarly, Harry Tzimitras, Director of the PRIO Cyprus Peace
Institute, told Inside Arabia that “Spain is a big, important EU
country, but with no strong baggage that jeopardizes its perceived neutral
position in the Eastern Mediterranean”—it has a “clean slate.”
Spain’s Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya talks during a news conference in Nicosia, Cyprus, Sept. 30, 2020. Laya aimed to convey her country’s solidarity with Cyprus amid tensions over a Turkish gas search in waters where Cyprus claims exclusive economic rights. (AP Photo/Petros Karadjias)
The increased economic interdependency between Spain and
Turkey could explain Spain’s more active role in the Athens-Ankara spat. As
pointed out by Tzimitras, “Spain has great exposure to Turkey’s economy given
that its second bank, BBVA, owns a big part of Turkey’s Garanti Bank, alongside
more general concerns regarding the volume of Turkey’s exports to the EU.”
In light of their expanding ties, Spain has increased its
profile in the region, mainly in the scenarios where Turkey is also present.
Accordingly, Minister González Laya visited both warring sides in Libya in
early September, taking part in the UN-led ceasefire negotiations.
During that same month, González Laya visited Cyprus where she met with President Nikos
Anastasiadis and the Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister. The official visit to
Nicosia was framed under the negotiations among EU members regarding the
sanctions against Belarus, where Nicosia demanded penalties against Turkey be
included in the package against Minsk. Though, ultimately, sanctions against
Turkey were not considered.
Looking Forward
While EU and Spanish diplomatic efforts during this past
summer appear to have had positive effects in the Eastern Mediterranean region,
it is unclear how long this tense calm can last. During the last few months,
Ankara yet again sent exploratory vessels to Greek and Cypriot waters. Furthermore, Turkey
raised the stakes in the Eastern Mediterranean when in mid-November 2020,
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visited the ghost city of Varosha in the self-proclaimed
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; a visit deemed as “an unprecedented provocation”
by Athens and Nicosia, triggering retaliatory words from EU officials.
Still, Spanish diplomacy is likely to follow this past
summer’s strategy. The Spanish government published in November a draft of its
foreign policy vision for the 2020-23 period. The
document outlined a push for multilateralism and realpolitik approaches.
Regarding Turkey, the plan states it is “a strategic partner” and that it is
necessary to maintain a European approach to anchor Turkey to the West and
qualifies the Eastern Mediterranean as a priority region for Spain.
Spain’s policies vis-à-vis Turkey’s interests and the supportive remarks by the Spanish President Pedro Sánchez, and by
the Minister González Laya, have also been reciprocated by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,
Turkey’s Foreign Minister. Çavuşoğlu wrote an article in January in La Razón (a
Spanish daily) praising Madrid’s constructive efforts in supporting
Turkey’s EU candidacy, and emphasizing their political and economic alliance.
In order to keep Turkey at bay, the EU appears to be exploring
new mechanisms, including the update of a key element in the Turkey-EU
relations, the Customs Union (CU) agreement. In the coming months “it is
expected that there will be serious attempts to modernize the CU” where “Spain
will have an important role to play in those discussions under the EU
umbrella,” Tzimitras told Inside Arabia.
Spain has capitalized on its influence in Turkey to improve
and increase economic and trade ties between Turkey and the EU.
Spain has capitalized on its influence in Turkey to improve
and increase economic and trade ties between Turkey and the EU, currently
framed under the 1995 CU agreement.
Spain has been one of the major EU economies to benefit from
the CU, but its diplomatic elite and Spanish companies with interests in Turkey
are now pushing for its modernization, which would include
updated economic parameters since it is 15 years old. There is also speculation
that an alternative to the CU modernization would be the creation of a new Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which would provide a “full liberalization of trade
in industrial goods and preferential access in non-goods areas.”
Indeed, Spain has not been the only actor pushing for a
modernization of the CU, EU member countries such as Italy and major financial institutions in Europe, such as
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), have also argued
that an updated trade and economic framework with Turkey is needed.
Moreover, the EU appears to be taking an approach that would
secure trade and economic relations with Turkey, while adhering to EU
neighboring states’ policy interests. For example, the press release that
followed the October 2020 EU Council (EUCO) meeting, did not mention Turkey’s
human rights violations, instead it referred exclusively to its geopolitical
conflict with Greece and Cyprus. For the first time, the EU held a compromise
agenda with Turkey by overlooking its domestic issues and not referring to the
Copenhagen Criteria, which outlines eligibility for EU membership.
Harry Tzimtras highlights that “Turkey is too big to fail, and
a failed Turkish economy could lead to more challenging political developments
that could ultimately negatively affect the entire EU community.”
Considering these factors, the conclusions of the EUCO meetings on
December 10 and 11, 2020 have yet again revealed the reservations EU leadership
has regarding harsher and more repressive policies against Turkey. Thus, Spain
and key EU partners are likely to keep pushing for a more agreeable agenda
regarding relations with Ankara, by which the modernization of the CU will play
a central role, and where political confrontation with Turkey will be
minimized.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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